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Abstract 
 In this paper, I investigate the nature of optimization frictions by studying 
the labor market of Danish students. This particular labor market is an 
interesting case study as it features a range of special institutional settings 
that affects students’ incentive to earn income and comparing outcomes 
across these settings effectively allow you to distinguish between different 
types of frictions. I find that the considered labor market is significantly 
affected by optimizations frictions that mask the bunching at kink points 
normally associated with a positive labor supply elasticity under standard 
theory. More concretely I find the dominant optimization frictions to be 
individuals’ inattention about their earnings process, while real adjustment 
costs and gradual learning appear to be of less importance. 
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1  Introduction 
Labor supply elasticities – or more generally earning elasticities – are key parameters in many 
areas of economics, e.g. optimal income taxation (Saez et al., 2012). However empirical iden-
tification of these parameters remains a challenge – especially in the likely presence of opti-
mization frictions, where Chetty (2012) shows that even small frictions limit the researcher 
to identify only bounds on the elasticities. Bounds that in many cases are so wide that they 
are likely to dwarf many of the econometric issues involved in the identification. 
In this paper, I shed light on the presence and underlying nature of these frictions by study-
ing the labor supply of Danish students. So far concrete evidence on frictions has been rela-
tively limited in the economics literature on labor supply, which reflects that identification of 
optimization frictions typically requires both high quality data and special institutional set-
tings – high quality data in order not to confound optimization errors by individuals with 
measurement error in the data and special institutional settings that allow separation of ra-
tional behavior from optimization errors. Kleven and Waseem (2013) is one of the few pa-
pers that fulfils both of these requirements, which enables them to estimate both a structural 
labor supply elasticity and the level of optimization frictions in a Pakistani setting, while re-
maining agnostic about the underlying nature of frictions.1 
The labor market for Danish students represents an interesting case study on optimization 
frictions for several reasons: 1) students face a sharp kink in their budget set created by the 
phase out of student benefits, 2) a reform in 2009 significantly increased the earnings level at 
which students reach the kink point and 3) students face a special institutional setting, where 
they effectively can choose between different budget sets. 
Having all of these institutional settings within a single labor market covered by rich register 
data allows you to distinguish between three of the main types of optimization frictions dis-
cussed in the literature – namely real adjustment costs (Attanasio, 2000), gradual learning 
(Mankiw and Reis, 2002 and Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) and (rational) inattention (Sims, 
2003) – by examining the outcomes around each setting. 
My main findings are the following: First, following the 2009 reform I find an immediate and 
non-trivial shift in the students’ earnings distribution compared to a very stable distribution 
both before and after the reform. Second, despite this clear evidence of a positive labor sup-
ply elasticity I find no sign of bunching at the kink point created by the phase out of student 
benefits. Finally, I find that a significant share of students fail to choose the budget set that is 
optimal given their final level of earnings.  
Taken together, these findings point to the presence of significant optimization frictions that 
mask the bunching at the kink point predicted by a standard labor supply model (Saez, 
2010). However, the findings do not point to real adjustment costs or gradual learning as the 
                                                      
1 In other contexts such as e.g. consumption, Chetty et al. (2009) show that salience of taxes can affect 
demand. 
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main types of frictions, as these types of frictions would imply a more gradual transition to a 
new earnings distribution following the 2009 reform.  
Instead the findings are consistent with a model, where individuals (rationally) choose their 
desired labor supply and thus implicit their target earnings, but where final earnings may 
deviate from this level due to unexpected shock to e.g. the wage rate. If individuals fail to 
realize such shocks and reoptimize behavior, their final earnings will deviate from their tar-
get. This prevents the formation of clear bunching in the earnings distribution, even if indi-
viduals quickly change their desired earnings in response to change in the institutional set-
tings. Put differently, the findings suggest that the dominant optimization frictions are indi-
viduals’ inattention about their earnings process during the year.  
After presenting graphical evidence on the above findings I proceed with a discussion of 
how to quantity the behavioral responses. This is not a trivial task as the lack of a clearly 
visible excess mass in the cross sectional setting makes it impossible to employ the standard 
bunching method developed by Saez (2010), and because the differences between individual 
desired and final earnings effectively mix the treatment and control groups as they are nor-
mally defined in difference-and-difference estimations. 2 
Instead I propose a method that resembles the method used by Chetty et al. (2013) and use 
the shift in the distribution following the 2009 reform to uncover the (local) counterfactual 
distribution at the kink point. Having the counterfactual distribution, I use the bunching 
method to translate the observed responses into elasticities for which I obtain lower bound 
estimates around 0.05-0.06 
2 Optimization frictions and labor market outcomes 
Before moving into the empirical analysis, I start by drawing a number of hypotheses about 
how different types of optimization frictions affect observed labor market outcomes around 
different stylized institutional settings. These will in section 3 be related to the actual institu-
tional settings facing Danish students. More concretely, I consider the following three styl-
ized settings: 
1. A kink point in the budget set created by a jump in the marginal tax rate. 
2. A tax reform that changes tax rates in some parts of the income distribution. 
3. Voluntary take up of benefits. 
Of these, the 2 first are standard institutional settings considered in the public finance litera-
ture, whereas the 3rd needs some additional explanation.  
The basic point is that the take up of benefits might only be optimal for individuals in certain 
earnings intervals. Consider e.g. a stylized benefit system consisting of a lump sum grant that 
is phased out with earnings according to some schedule. With differences in the level of the 
                                                      
2 This method is e.g. used by Feldstein (1995) and Gruber and Saez (2002). See Kleven and Schultz 
(2014) for an application on Danish data. 
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lump sum grant and the phase out rate, the optimality of taking up a given benefit may de-
pend on the individual’s earned income. 
Such a situation is shown in figure 1, which contains two budget sets. Budget set 1 with a 
low level of benefits, but no phase out, and budget set 2 with a higher level of benefits that is 
phased out with earnings at a rate of 67 percent. At this phase-out rate net benefits reach 0 at 
an earned income of 150 and the budget set 2 thus kinks in this point. Comparing these two 
budgets, we see that the disposable income with budget set 2 is higher than budget set 1 for 
earnings below 75, while the opposite is the case with earnings above 75.  
Figure 1 
Illustration of the potential sub-optimality of taking up of higher benefits. 
 
Notes: The figure shows two stylized budget set. One budget set (budget set 1) with a low lump sum 
grant and a no phase out rate and one (budget set 2) with a higher lump sum grant but a 
phase out rate of 67 percent. At this phase-out rate net benefits reach 0 at an income of 150. 
The disposable under the two budget sets are the same at earnings of 75. 
 
From these three stylized policy settings it is possible to draw a number of hypotheses about 
what outcomes you should expect to find under the presence of different types of optimiza-
tion frictions. More concretely, I consider the effects of 3 broad groups of optimization fric-
tions – namely: 
1. Real adjustment costs on the labor market. 
2. Gradual learning about the institutional settings. 
3. (Rational) inattention. 
However before doing so I start by considering the labor market outcomes in a world with-
out optimization frictions. In this case individuals would bunch at the kink point created by 
the jump in the marginal tax rate and thereby create clear excess mass in the earnings distri-
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bution at this point. Furthermore, the excess mass would be proportional to the labor supply 
elasticity (Saez, 2010). Following a tax reform that changes tax rates in some part of the in-
come distribution, we should find an immediate change in earnings for the individuals who 
are directly affected by the change in incentives and finally, we should expect individuals to 
only take up benefits if it increases their disposable income – i.e. no one with earnings above 
75 in figure 1 should take up the higher benefits, but stay on the low benefits. 
Against this benchmark I start by considering the effect of real adjustment costs in the labor 
market (see e.g. Attanasio, 2000). Real adjustment costs imply that it is costly for individuals 
to change their earnings, e.g. because it requires finding a new job, which might take time 
and effort. In this case, individuals are willing to accept jobs located in an earnings interval 
around their optimal point, as the expected utility gain of finding a better job match does not 
outweigh the search costs (Chetty et al., 2011). As a consequence, only a fraction of the indi-
viduals, who in a frictionless world would bunch at the kink point, do so in this case causing 
the excess mass to be spread over an interval around the kink point (fuzzy bunching). 
When it comes to the effect of a tax reform, the presence of real adjustment costs imply that 
not all individuals will find it optimal to change their earnings immediately. Instead they 
might choose to keep their current job if they e.g. expect that they in the near future have to 
change job for other reasons. As a consequence, we should expect to see only a gradual 
change in the earnings distribution. 
Finally, real adjustment costs in the labor market should not necessarily have anything to do 
with individuals being able to optimally choose whether or not to take up benefits. As long 
as the administrative system is fairly simple, the economic costs of taking up benefits are 
trivial, and we should therefore expect individuals to take up benefits optimally given their 
current job choice. Even if this choice deviates from what they would have chosen in a fric-
tionless world. 
The second general class of optimization frictions that I consider is gradual learning (see e.g. 
Mankiw and Reis, 2002 and Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). Gradual learning implies that 
individuals do not have perfect information about the institutional setting, e.g. when they are 
new to the system or when the system is changed. This would e.g. include knowledge of the 
precise position of the kink point and the design of the benefit system, and as consequence 
we should expect only fuzzy bunching around the actual kink point and sub-optimal take up 
of benefits – especially among individuals with less experience with the institutional settings. 
Likewise, gradual learning implies that the knowledge of a reform would expand gradually 
after its implementation and we would therefore expect to see a gradual change in the earn-
ings distribution. 
Finally, I consider the effect of (rational) inattention (see Sims, 2003). Rational inattention 
builds on the idea that economic circumstances might change over time, but that it is costly 
for individuals to pay close attention to these changes. Changing circumstances – which in a 
frictionless world would have warranted reoptimization of individual behavior – therefore 
might not be noted by individuals leaving them with ex post sub-optimal behavior. 
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Formulated in this way there is a potential big overlap between gradual learning and inatten-
tion, as e.g. inattention about changes in the institutional setting will be exactly the same as 
the gradual learning described above. I will therefore make the following distinction between 
gradual leaning and inattention: Gradual learning refers to learning about institutional set-
tings that we normally would think as constant in the long run (changes in institutional set-
tings such as tax rates only happen as a result of reforms). In contrast, inattention refers to 
inattention about individual economic factors that may vary even in the long run – factors 
such as individual wages, working requirements etc. In a world were these individual factors 
are partly random, individuals will never learn the true values of these by accumulated expe-
rience, but can only know them by paying close attention to their evolution.  
Applied to the labor market, inattention implies that individuals will aim at a desired level of 
labor supply and earnings, but that their final earnings will be distributed around this level 
due to random shocks to individual economic factors, which the individuals fail to realize 
and thus offset by reoptimization. As a consequence, we should expect only fuzzy bunching 
around a kink point in the budget set. Likewise, we should expect to see some individuals 
take up benefits even though it ex post turns out to be a sub-optimal choice. However, de-
spite of the inattention about the evolution of individual economic factors, we should expect 
to see an immediate change in the earnings distribution following a tax reform, as individuals 
adjust their desired earnings to the new incentives. 
Finally, it should be noted that the notion of inattention as being rational rely on the pre-
sumption that the costs of paying closer attention to changes in the economic circumstances 
outweigh the expected benefits of smaller optimization errors. However more generally inat-
tention might also be irrational just as the inattention might also be related to the effects of 
the individuals’ own actions – e.g. in the labor market, where individuals’ labor supply and 
earnings may vary from month to month, while taxation is based on the cumulative earnings 
over the year. In this case, knowing the effect of extra earnings in one month requires the 
individuals to keep track of (and predict) earnings in all months. 
The predictions from the different hypotheses described above are summarized in table 1 
and as the table shows each type of optimization frictions lead to a unique set of predictions 
across the different institutional settings. Combining the observed outcomes across these 
settings therefore in principle allow you to distinguish between different types of frictions. 
Table 1 
Hypotheses: What to expect under different types of optimization frictions? 
 Bunching at 
the kink point 
Effect of  
a tax reform 
Take up  
of benefits 
Benchmark:    
No frictions Clear bunching Immediate change  Optimal take up 
Optimization frictions:    
Real adjustment cost Fuzzy bunching Gradual change  Optimal take up 
Gradual learning Fuzzy bunching Gradual change Sub-optimal take up 
(Rational) inattention Fuzzy bunching Immediate change Sub-optimal take up 
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3  Institutional settings: students’ incentive to earn income 
In this section I present the key features of the Danish student benefit system and relate it to 
the stylized institutional settings discussed in section 2.3 
Danish students enrolled in education above primary school (ISCED2011 level 3 and above) 
are eligible to state financed student benefits from the age of 18. Benefit rates vary depend-
ing on the type of education and civil status, but in 2008 the basic rate for the typical stu-
dents enrolled in tertiary educations (ISCED2011 level 5 and above) was 5,000 DKK per 
month (1 USD ≈ 6 DKK). 
In addition to receiving these benefits, students are allowed to earn income of up to 6,400 
DKK per month.4 If they earn more than this baseline income limit (on a yearly basis) the 
excess is deducted from the amount of benefits they are eligible for thus creating a kink in 
their budget set. Of the first 9,500 DKK 50 percent is deducted, while further excess earn-
ings is deducted 100 percent.5 
If students want to earn more, they can increase the limit by cancelling one or more months 
of benefits. By cancelling one month of benefits a student increases the income limit by 
9,500 DKK, which translates into a phase out rate of 5,000/9,500 = 52 percent. Administra-
tively, it is fairly easy for students to cancel benefits, as it is done through a simple webpage, 
where students can click benefits in individual months on and off. 
Taken together with the normal income tax system, which – for incomes in the range con-
sidered here – imposes a marginal tax rate of 41 percent (excl. VAT) the phase out of bene-
fits causes the effective marginal tax rate jumps from 41 to 72 percent when students’ earn-
ings exceed 76,400 DKK annually.6 
However, the effective marginal tax rate might jump even more, if students fail to cancel the 
right amount of benefits and thereby end up hitting the phase out rate of 100 percent. If e.g. 
a student earns more than 9,500 DKK above the baseline limit and does not cancel student 
benefit he faces as marginal tax rate of 100 percent. In this case it would be optimal to cancel 
one month of benefits. 
                                                      
3 A more detailed description can be found in appendix A.  
4 Income counted against the income limit is called “own income” and includes labor income, trans-
fers other than student benefits and capital income with the exceptions of certain types of stock in-
come. All relevant variables are drawn from detailed register data organized by Statistics Denmark 
(DST) covering the entire Danish population. A more detailed description of these registers and the 
variables used can be found in appendix B. 
5 Finally, if the amount of student benefits that a student has to pay back exceeds 7,600 DKK (2008 
level), the entire payback is increased by 7 percent. This notch implies that the marginal tax rate for 
excess earnings above this amount exceeds 100 percent. This is not shown in figure 2. 
6 There is a caveat to the calculation of the effective marginal tax rate, when students cancel student 
benefits. For most university students student benefits are limited to a period of 6 years (compared to 
a standard study time of 5 years) and by cancelling a number of months of benefits, the student can 
save them for later use. Some student might therefore not see the cancelling of benefits as the full loss 
assumed here. The probability of this does not significantly affect the conclusions drawn in the paper 
and are discussed in section 4 and 6 below. 
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This problem corresponds to the problem of optimal take up of benefits described in section 
2, where 12 months of benefits are optimal for students earning up to 86,000 DKK annually. 
11 months are optimal for students with income between 86,000 and 95,500 DKK. For stu-
dents earning extra 9,500 DKK 10 months is optimal etc., as illustrated in figure 2.  
Figure 2 
Effective budget sets for students depending on benefits take up, 2008 
 
Notes: The baseline income limit is calculated as 12 x the monthly basic amount of 6,400 DKK. 
Yearly disposable income is calculated as first gross income consisting of 5,000 DKK x the 
number of months of benefits taken up plus earned income up to the income limit, which 
increases by 9,500 DKK for each month not taken up. Above this income limit the first 
9,500 DKK in earned income is deducted in student benefits at 50 percent, while further ex-
cess is deducted 100 percent. Finally, gross income is turned into disposable income based 
on a personal allowance of 41,000 DKK and a marginal tax rate in the normal income system 
of 41 percent. 6 DKK ≈ 1 USD. 
Sources: Own calculations based on www.su.dk. 
 
However, the switch different budget sets by cancelling benefits is complicated by the fact 
that students have to do so actively prior to actually receiving the benefits. Cancelling bene-
fits for a given month has to be done prior to the 15th the month before, while students typi-
cally receive their wage check at the end of the month or with an additional month’s lag. E.g. 
cancelling benefits in December has to be done prior to November 15th, where students in 
general only have seen their wage checks up to October or September. 
This time difference between, when students have to cancel benefits and when they have the 
actual information about the monthly (or yearly) income implies that students have to pay 
close attention to their income process during the year and to some degree predict what they 
will earn a couple of months into the future in order to cancel the right amount. 
The student benefit system has remained largely unchanged through the period 2004-2011, 
which is considered in this analysis, except from a reform in 2009 that increased the baseline 
income limit by 25 percent for students enrolled in tertiary educations, while leaving it un-
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changed for lower levels of education, cf. table 2. At the same time the phase out rate for 
tertiary students was also increased from 52 to 62 percent and thus causing an increase in the 
effective marginal tax rate from 72 to 78 percent. 
Table 2 
Development in the yearly baseline income limit 
1,000 DKK 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Students in tertiary education 72.1 74.1 76.4 97.7 101.6 103.5 
Students in lower education 72.1 74.1 76.4 79.0 82.2 83.8 
 
Notes: The baseline income limit refers to the income limit for students, who receive full benefits 
(12 months). Tertiary educations include university education and educations such as nurses 
and school teachers (ISCED2011 level 5 and above). Lower educations include high school 
(gymnasium) and vocational educations (ISCED2011 level 3-4). 
Sources: www.su.dk. 
 
In what follows all numbers related to income variables have been translated to 2008 values 
using the indexation implied by the baseline income limit for students in lower educations. 
4  Graphical evidence on labor supply responses and optimization 
frictions 
In section 3, I linked the specific features of the Danish student benefit system to the styl-
ized institutional settings listed in section 2. In this section I examine the labor market out-
comes around each of the institutional settings and compare it with the hypotheses drawn in 
section 2. 
4. 1 Evidence from bunching at the kink point 
Figure 3 shows the earnings distribution for students enrolled in tertiary educations before 
the 2009 reform centered on the baseline income limit. Only students, who are fully eligible 
for student benefits the entire year is included in this figure, however inclusion is not condi-
tional on actually receiving student benefits (i.e. students are allowed to cancel benefits). 
Under the assumption that students cancel the right amount of benefits, their effective mar-
ginal tax rate jump from 41 to 72 percent at the baseline income limit as described in section 
2. 
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Figure 3 
The earnings distribution for tertiary students, 2006-2008 
 
Notes: Students have to be fully eligible for student benefits (but necessarily receive student bene-
fits) and have yearly earnings above 6,500 DKK to be included in the distributions. The 
marginal tax rate (MTR) is calculated under the assumption that students always cancel the 
optimal amount of student benefits. In that case MTR = 1 – (1-t)•(1-q), where t = 0.41 and q 
= 0 below the baseline income limit and q = 0.52 above. The baseline income limit was 
76,400 DKK in 2008. Bin size = 3,000 DKK. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
 
The figure shows that the earnings distribution was very stable during the 3 years prior to the 
reform and with no clear sign of excess mass around the kink point. In a frictionless world 
this would imply that the labor supply elasticity was negligible, but from the cross sectional 
evidence alone – which most bunching studies rely on – we are not able to determine wheth-
er this outcome is truly driven by a zero labor supply elasticity or whether optimization fric-
tions prevent the formation of a clear excess mass at the kink point. Naturally, we cannot 
distinguish between different types of optimization frictions either. 
4.2 Evidence from the 2009 reform 
When comparing the pre-reform earnings distribution with the distributions after the 2009 
reform, we see in figure 4, a clear shift in the distribution with mass moving from below the 
initial kink point to a range above. Given the fact that the distribution was very stable in the 
years prior to the reform, this shift constitutes compelling graphical evidence for a positive 
labor supply elasticity, suggesting that the lack of bunching at the kink points is due to opti-
mization frictions.7 
 
                                                      
7 The interpretation of the shift in the earnings distribution as an indication of a positive labor supply 
response to the 2009 reform is also supported by the fact that the earnings distribution for students in 
lower educations, who was unaffected by the 2009 reform, remained stable.  
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Figure 4 
The earnings distribution for tertiary students before and after the 2009 reform 
 
Notes: See notes to figure 3. For the years 2009-11 income is measured relative to the baseline in-
come limit without the 2009 reform. This corresponds to the baseline income limit for stu-
dents in lower education listed in table 2. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
 
Furthermore, the fact that shift in the distribution appears to happen instantaneously from 
2008 to 2009 speaks against both real adjustment cost and gradual learning as the dominant 
frictions. Taken together, the two first pieces of empirical evidence thus points to inattention 
as the dominant optimization frictions in this labor market. 
It may finally be noted that the “excess mass” revealed by the shift in the distribution is cen-
tered below the kink point. I return to this finding in section 6 and discuss it in greater de-
tails in appendix E. 
4.3 Evidence from the cancelling of student benefits 
Turning to the cancelling of student benefits, I consider the earnings distribution for stu-
dents conditional on the amount of student benefits they cancel. In figure 5 this is done for 
students who have cancelled exactly 1 month and thus taken up 11 months of benefits. 
By cancelling 1 month of benefits these students increase their income limit to 86,000 DKK 
(before the 2009 reform) and we should not expect to find students with earnings 9,500 
DKK above this amount (where they reach the 100 percent marginal tax rate). If they wished 
to earn more they should have cancelled an extra month of student benefits in order to in-
crease the income limit and lower their effective marginal tax from 100 to 72 percent. 
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Figure 5 
The earnings distribution for tertiary students who cancel 1 month of benefits 
 
Notes: Excess income is defined as the yearly earning income relative to the actual income limit that 
the individual is facing. The marginal tax rate (MTR) is calculated using the formula MTR = 
1 – (1-t)•(1-q), where t = 0.41 and q = 0.50 for the first 9,500 DKK above and q = 100 
above this level. Bin size = 3,000 DKK. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
 
From figure 5, however, we see that, even though the earnings distribution for this group of 
students is more or less centered on the actual income limit that they faced after cancelling 1 
month of benefits, a significant proportion of students deviate from this earnings level.8  
Considering e.g. the upper part of the distribution, 14.9 percent of the students, who have 
cancelled exactly 1 month of benefits, earned more than 9,500 DKK above their actual in-
come limit and thus hit the effective marginal tax rate of 100 percent. As a consequence, 
these students could with relatively little effort have cancelled another month of benefits and 
thereby increased their disposable income. For the 6.3 percent, who had an excess income of 
more than 20,000 DKK the increase in disposable income would have been at least 3,000 
DKK (≈ 500 USD). 
Considering the lower part of the distribution we also see a significant proportion (70 per-
cent) of students, who earned less than the actual income limit. In principle these students 
cancelled benefits without the need to do so and therefore received fewer benefits than they 
could have. However, there might be intertemporal considerations that rationalize this be-
havior, as student benefits are limited to typically 6 years, student might find it optimal to 
save benefits for later use by cancelling some months even in years, where their earnings are 
                                                      
8 When interpreting the distribution in figure 5 as a result of optimization frictions it is important to 
eliminate measurement errors from the data, as these will otherwise result in an upward bias of the 
amount of frictions. An assessment of the amount of measurement errors and the results robustness 
to these are presented in appendix B and C. 
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below the income limit. In contrast to the upper part of the distribution, it is therefore less 
straight forward to take this as firm evidence of sub-optimal cancelling. 
While the sub-optimal cancelling of benefits – as argued above – speaks against real adjust-
ment costs as the dominant type of optimization frictions it might be consistent with both 
gradual learning and inattention, cf. table 1. However, a key difference between these two 
explanations is that under gradual learning we should expect to find sub-optimal cancelling 
of benefits primarily among new students. 
In order to investigate this, I show in figure 6 the distribution from figure 5 split into 2 sub-
samples of students, who have either be a student for 2 or more years or had a high income 
the year before – with the idea being that these two sub-samples should have better infor-
mation about the structure of the student benefit system.  
Figure 6 
The earnings distribution for tertiary students who cancel 1 month of student bene-
fits split on student history 
 
Notes: See notes to figure 5. Student tenure is measured from the start of the student’s first tertiary 
education. High income last year is defined as having an income no less than 20,000 DKK 
below the baseline income limit. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
 
As this figure shows, there are fundamentally no differences between the distributions, and 
this evidence does therefore not support that the sub-optimal cancelling is caused by gradual 
learning.  
Above the level of optimization frictions is quantified by the share of students in the domi-
nated region. However, this metric is problematic as it depends crucially on the part of the 
sample that is included in the calculation. Considering e.g. the students, who do not cancel 
benefits, only 5.0 percent end up in the dominated region (compared to 14.9 percent above), 
but this is of course due to the inclusion of a large number of students, who are well below 
and not targeting the income limit. 
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Interpreting the frictions as earnings uncertainty and inattention, a more natural way to 
quantify the level of frictions is to ask how much variance in their final earnings (relative to 
their desired earnings) individuals are will to accept and what the expected loss of disposable 
income from this variance amounts to.  
One way to quantify this is to exploit that the dominated region bounds the range in which 
students rationally can set their desired earnings. For the students who cancel exactly 1 
month of benefits this range is limited to earnings between 86,000 and 95,500 DKK (excess 
income of 0-9,500 DKK in figure 5), and the shape of the earnings distribution outside this 
range is therefore informative about the size of earnings errors that the individuals make. 
Combining this information with the increase in disposable income that students could have 
gained by cancelling more or less student benefits, the costs of inattention for the students 
near the income limits can be estimated to 2-3,000 DKK.9 
5 The nature of inattention 
The graphical evidence in section 4 points to inattention about the earnings process during 
the year as the dominant optimization frictions in the labor market for Danish students. 
However, because of the time lag of 1-2 months between, when students have to decide 
whether or not to cancel benefits and when they have precise information about their cur-
rent accumulated earnings, the sub-optimal cancelling we observe in figure 5 might simply 
reflect income surprises in the end of the year. In this case we should expect to find a posi-
tive correlation between positive individual income surprises and the amount of income 
exceeding their income limit.  
In order to investigate this, I use monthly income register data available from 2008 and 
proxy an end of the year income surprise as the difference between the sum of November 
and December pay and the sum of the September and October pay. Plotting this measure 
against the individual excess income gives the picture presented in figure 7. 
  
                                                      
9 For the exact calculation and description of the method see appendix D. 
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Figure 7 
Average end of year income surprise over the income distribution, 2008-11 
 
Notes: The figure only includes individuals who cancelled either 0 or 1 month if student benefits. 
The individual end of year income surprise is calculated as the difference between the sum of 
November and December pay and the sum of the September and October pay. Only labor 
income is included in this data and months without employment are treated as 0 income. Bin 
size = 9,000 DKK. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
 
From this figure, we see a clear tendency to find larger end of year income surprises among 
the individuals who end up with larger excess income. However, the magnitude of the effect 
is not enough to explain the level of sub-optimal cancelling. Going e.g. from an excess in-
come of 10,000 DKK to 50,000 DKK the average income surprise only increases by around 
2,000 DKK, which therefore only explains 5 percent of the excess.  
The figure, however, reveals another interesting feature from the monthly income data. It 
seems to be the case that students reduce their earnings when they approach the income 
limit. This behavior is more clearly visible when plotting the average end of year income 
surprise against the level of earnings that the students would have had without the income 
surprise – i.e. the yearly level of earnings if the November and December pay had equaled 
the earnings in September and October, cf. figure 8.  
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Figure 8 
Average end of year income surprise over the predicted income distribution, 2008-11 
 
Notes: See notes to figure 7. Predicted excess income is the excess income that the individual would 
have had without the end of year income surprise – i.e. the actual earned income minus the 
difference between the sum of the November and December pay and the sum of the Sep-
tember and October pay. Bin size = 9,000 DKK. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
 
From figure 8 we see a consistent drop in the average end of year income surprise of magni-
tude of 6-8,000 DKK for individuals, who at their September-October earnings rate were in 
risk of exceeding their income limit by the end of the year. 
This drop could of course just be due to mean reversion following a positive income shock 
in September-October, but note that the drop is the same in the pre-reform year 2008 as in 
the post-reform years despite that the baseline income limit has been increased by 25 per-
cent. That the drop occurs over the same range of excess income therefore reflects that the 
behavior has moved up in the earnings distribution.10  
This type of behavior is not straight forward to reconcile with standard rationale inattention. 
Under risk neutrality standard rational inattention would suggest that individuals choose a 
job, which in expectation would give them their desired level of earnings. In the labor market 
considered here it appears that individuals take a job, which in expectation gives them a level 
of earnings above their desired level. Something that they first realize in the end of the year 
and instead of cancelling an extra month of student benefits – which would be a relative easy 
way to avoid the 100 percent effective marginal tax rate – they seek to reduce their labor 
supply and thus their earnings. 
                                                      
10 Indeed, most of the shift in the distribution after the 2009 reform observed in figure 4 can be at-
tributed to the drop in the November-December earnings first occurring at higher earnings levels 
after the reform. 
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One way to rationalize it, is to assume that individuals are relatively risk adverse and thus 
take a job that with a high probability will give them their desired level of earnings, but once 
this level has been achieved they react to the reduced earnings incentives created by the 
phasing out of student benefits and lowered their labor supply. However, perhaps more 
realistically the inattention that individuals exhibit in this labor market is not fully rational.  
6  Estimation of the labor supply response 
After having shown in the sections above the likely presence of significant optimization fric-
tions in the Danish student labor market, I proceed in this section with a discussion of how 
this is likely to affect the way labor supply elasticities are normally estimated. 
Considering the labor supply responses observed in section 4 it clear that the two “standard” 
methods for estimating labor supply responses in public finance – the Saez (2010) bunching 
method and the Feldstein (1995) difference-in-difference (DiD) method – may fail to under-
cover the true elasticity. 
When applying the bunching method researchers typically calculate the excess mass by fitting 
a high order polynomial to the distribution around the kink point excluding a range, where 
there is “visible bunching”. However, in the student labor market considered here there is no 
visible bunching and a credible counterfactual distribution using this method in the purely 
cross sectional setting would therefore in practice follow the actual distribution yielding a 
zero excess mass and elasticity. 
Likewise, when applying the DiD method, the labor supply elasticity is estimated by compar-
ing individuals who are treated by (tax) reforms to different extent, where treatment statuses 
typically are assigned based on pre-reform earnings.11 In the case considered here, this would 
imply that students with earnings between the pre-reform and the post-reform kink point 
would be assigned a lower marginal tax rate and the students above the-post reform kink 
point a slightly higher marginal tax rate. However, from figure 4 it is clear that the shift in the 
distribution happens over a much wider range than is directly affected by the changes in 
effective marginal tax rates and as a consequence the assigned treatment and control groups 
would consist of a mix of the true treatment and control groups. 
To undercover a labor supply elasticity I instead employ a method that resemble the method 
use by Chetty et al. (2013) and utilize the shift in the distribution created by the 2009 reform 
to undercover the (local) counterfactual distribution and hence the excess mass created by 
                                                      
11 In practices the estimation procedure is more advanced using the treatment status based on pre-
reform earnings as an instrument and controlling for underlying income dynamics such as mean rever-
sion. See Weber (2014) for a recent discussion of the DiD method. 
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the pre- and post-reform kink.12 Finally, I turn this excess mass into a labor supply elasticity 
using the Saez (2010) bunching formula.13 
Figure 9 shows the average income distribution over the 3 pre- and post-reform years con-
sidered in this analysis, and illustrates the shift in the distribution after the reform also seen 
in figure 4. From this figure we can identify two areas with excess mass: Taking the post-
reform distribution as a (local) counterfactual we find an excess mass 3.1 percentage points 
at the pre-reform kink point. Likewise, taking the pre-reform distribution as a counterfactual 
we find an excess mass of 2.1 percentage points at the post-reform kink point. 
Figure 9 
Identifying excess mass using the 2009 reform 
 
Notes: See notes to figure 4. For the calculations of the elasticities see table 3. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
 
Using the Saez (2010) bunching formula, the change in earnings in responses to a tax change (𝑑𝑧) can be expressed as: 
                                                      
12 The method resembles the method used by Chetty et. al. (2013) except that the source of the varia-
tion in the distribution here does not come from differences in knowledge about the tax schedule in a 
cross sectional setting, but from the time series variation created by a reform. 
13 One caveat has to be mentioned in connection with the translation of the excess mass into a labor 
supply elasticity. The formula derived by Saez (2010) rely theoretically on the marginal indifference 
individual, who bunch at the kink point, to change his earnings the same amount found when com-
paring two linear tax systems. In the presence of earnings uncertainty, where individuals not necessari-
ly hit their desired income, this will no longer be the case and it is therefore not trivial that the formula 
is valid in this setting. Saez (1999) performs simulations of the income distribution and assess the 
amount of bunching under various model setups, incl. income uncertainty, but he does not evaluate 
the performance of the bunching estimate in these simulations. As a robustness check I therefore 
preform a more structure estimation of the labor supply elasticity in appendix E, which yields almost 
the same elasticity estimates as here. 
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 𝑑𝑧 = 𝐵𝑓(𝑧) (1) 
where 𝐵 is the excess mass and 𝑓(𝑧) is the counterfactual density at the kink point (𝑧), and 
inserting this into the formula for the elasticity (𝜀) as: 
 𝜀 = 𝑑𝑧𝑑(1 − 𝑡) 1 − 𝑡𝑧 = 𝐵𝑓(𝑧) 1𝑧 1 − 𝑡𝑑(1 − 𝑡) (2) 
yields an elasticity of 0.06 for the pre-reform kink point and 0.05 for the post-reform kink 
point, cf. table 3.  
Table 3 
Calculating the labor supply elasticity for the tertiary students 
 Pre-reform kink point Post-reform kink point 
Excess mass (B) 3.11 2.06 
Counterfactual density (f(z)) 0.87 0.47 
Kink point 76,4 97,7 
dz/z = B / f(z) / z 0.05 0.05 
d(1-t)/(1-t) 0.74 0.98 
Elasticity 0.06 0.05 
 
Notes: The counterfactual density is estimated as the average density in the two bins around the 
relevant kink point divided by the bin size. Bin size = 3,000 DKK. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
 
This elasticity estimate is perhaps surprisingly small compared to the consensus in the litera-
ture of around 0.25 according to Saez et. al. (2012) and considering that many students prob-
ably have a large degree of flexibility in increasing their earnings if desired.14 However there 
are a couple of reasons why the estimated elasticity is a lower bound. 
First of all taking the post-reform distribution as the (local) counterfactual for the pre-reform 
distribution (and vice-versa) rely on the assumption the post-reform distribution at the pre-
reform kink point is unaffected by the post-reform kink point. This would be true in a fric-
tionless world, but with the fuzzy bunching created by optimization frictions this will not 
necessarily hold.  
Examining figure 9 it indeed seems to be the case that the excess mass around the post-
reform kink point start to build up already at the pre-reform kink point and thereby biasing 
both the pre-reform and the post-reform excess mass downwards. 
Secondly, as student benefits are limited to typically 6 years, some students might not see it 
as a full loss to cancel benefits as assumed above. If students expect to use the saved benefits 
later the real loss is only in terms of the difference in present value. 
                                                      
14 Working in the other direction is the fact that students might use a student job to gain valuable job 
experience, in which case the low intratemporal elasticity reflect future career concerns. However, 
dividing student job into non-relevant jobs (retail, waitering and postal service) and relevant jobs (eve-
rything else) does not give different elasticity estimates, which indicate that the future career concerns 
are not the prime reason for the low estimates. 
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This implies that the phase out rate used so far – and hence the size of the kink point – is an 
upper bound of the actual phase out rate further implying that the estimated elasticity is a 
lower bound. Assuming e.g. that 20 percent of the students in a given year is indifferent 
between receiving benefits within the year or saving them for later imply that the average 
kink size will be 20 percent lower than the one used above. Scaling down 𝑑 log(1 − 𝑡) by 
this amount, increases the elasticities to 0.08 and 0.06, respectively. 
Finally, I return to the fact that the excess mass revealed by the shift in the earnings distribu-
tion following the 2009 reform is centered below and not on the kink point, as you would 
expect in a normal tax system under earnings uncertainty. However, as I show in appendix 
E, this is fully consistent with the model under the institutional settings considered here. The 
reason is that, while earnings uncertainty in a normal tax system “smoothes” the jump in the 
marginal tax rate symmetrically around the kink point, this not the case, when students have 
the possibility to cancelling benefits. Without this possibility, the jump in the marginal tax 
would be from 41 to 100 percent, and the smoothed effective margin tax rate faced by stu-
dents follow the symmetric profile of this kink until the effective rate equals the phase out 
rate, where after it is caped. In this way, the smoothed profile of the effective marginal tax is 
longer symmetric around the kink point, which causes the excess mass to be centered below 
the kink point. 
7  Conclusion 
In this paper, I have investigated the nature and impact of labor market optimization fric-
tions among Danish students. This labor market represents an interesting case study as it 
features a number of special institutional settings, which allow you to distinguish between 
different types of optimizations frictions. 
Examining labor market outcomes across these institutional settings I find clear evidence of 
a positive labor supply response following a reform in 2009 that substantially increased the 
earnings level at which phase out of student benefits begins. Yet, despite of this clear evi-
dence of a positive labor supply elasticity, I find no visible bunching at the kink point created 
by the phase out in contrast to what standard theory suggest (Saez, 2010). 
I take this as evidence of significant optimization frictions that mask the labor market out-
comes suggested by standard theory – a finding that might be surprising given that student 
labor markets in general are associated with a lot of job turnover and part time workers and 
thus expected to have a high degree of flexibility. However, this is not at odd, as a closer 
examination of the observed outcomes speaks against real adjustment costs or gradual learn-
ing about the institutional settings as the dominant optimization frictions. In particular be-
cause the positive labor supply responses after the 2009 reform materialize immediately. 
Instead, the evidence is consistent with inattention about the earnings process during the 
year as being the dominant frictions among the individuals in the considered labor market. 
Of course, the relative strength of the different types of frictions might not be directly trans-
ferable to other labor markets and in particular you would probably expect real adjustment 
Labor Supply and Optimization Frictions 
21 
 
 
to play a larger role in the regular labor market, where workers in general tend to be more 
specialized full-time employees. However, the finding that inattention in itself can create 
large enough optimization frictions to mask the bunching expected at kinks points is inter-
esting even for the broader labor market. 
Following the investigation of the relative importance of the different optimization frictions 
I discuss the implications for identifying the underlying labor supply elasticity and propose a 
method that utilizes the shift in the earnings distribution created by the 2009 reform to un-
cover the local counterfactual distribution around the kink points created by the phase out of 
student benefits. Having this counterfactual distribution, I use the Saez (2010) bunching 
formula and estimate a labor supply elasticity in with a lower bound in the range of 0.05-
0.06. 
This method is in many ways a compelling method for estimating labor supply elasticities, 
but at the same it time puts high requirements on the data being used. Indeed, as the pres-
ence of optimization frictions causes a mixing of treatment and control groups in the way 
they are typically assigned in the commonly used Feldstein (1995) difference-in-difference 
method, you are forced to rely more heavily on the time series variation and this is only cred-
ible if the earnings distribution is stable in the non-reform year. This is potential a problem 
in labor markets, where real adjustments or gradual learning play a more important role, as 
this would cause the labor supply responses to be more gradual following a reform – a grad-
ual responses that often will be difficult for the researcher to credibly attribute to the reform.  
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Appendix A: The Danish student benefit system 
A1 Student benefit rates 
Danish students enrolled in most educations above the primary school (ISCED2011 level 3 
and above) are eligible to state financed student benefits from the age of 18. Benefit rates 
vary depending on the type of education and civil status with the main rates (2008 level) 
listed in table A1. Benefits for students aged 18-19 in lower educations (ISCED2011 level 3-
4) furthermore depend on their parents’ income. 
Table A1 
Overview over basic student benefit rates, 2008 
Monthly rate (DKK) Baseline rate Reduced with 
parents’ income1) 
Minimum rate 
Lower education and aged 18-19 
Living with parents 2,489 8.76 / 1,000 DKK 1,108 
Not living with parents2) 5,007 4.45 / 1,000 DKK 3,211 
Tertiary education or lower education and aged 20+ 
Living with parents 2,489 0 / 1,000 DKK 2,489 
Not living with parents 5,007 0 / 1,000 DKK 5,007 
 
Notes: Tertiary education include university education and educations such as nurses and school 
teachers (ISCED2011 level 5 and above). Lower educations include high school (gymnasium) 
and vocational educations (ISCED2011 level 3-4). 
1) Benefits to student in lower education below age 20 depend on the parents’ income in the 
way that the baseline rate is reduced by the listed amount for parent income exceeding 
273.644 DKK until the minimum rate is reached. An extra allowance for the parents’ income 
of 29.046 DKK is given for each sibling under the age of 18. 
2) Students in lower education below age 20 have to apply for the higher benefits even if they 
are not living with their parents. 
Sources: www.su.dk  
 
On top of these basic rates it is possible to obtain a number of supplement payments sum-
marized in table A2. 
Table A2 
Overview over supplement student benefit rates, 2008 
 DKK per month 
Supplement for single parents  5,007 
Supplement if both parents are on student benefits  2,000 
Disability supplement on tertiary educations 7,120 
Supplement for tuition fees (maximum) 1,954 
 
Notes: The 2008 special rates were no longer available online. The rates listed here are therefore 
based on the 2009 rates indexed back using the increase in the basic rates. 
Sources: www.su.dk  
 
The criteria for the different rates can be updated on a monthly basis and individual rates 
may therefore change during the year. This is likely to be a source of error in the prediction 
of final student benefits described in appendix B given that the demographic information in 
the registers only is available on a yearly basis. 
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On top of these rates students have under some circumstances the possibility to “double 
clip”, which means that the students receive a double benefit rate for that month. Prior to 
the 2009 reform this was possible in 3 situations: 
1. During the last 12 month of the education if the student have cancelled student 
benefits in previous months. 
2. The last month before paid internship (where it is not possible to get student ben-
efits). 
3. In connection with childbirth or adoption. 
After the 2009 reform only the two last situations still apply. 
In most educations student benefits are limited to the standard study time, except on univer-
sity educations where student benefits are limited to 72 “clip” = 6 years, which is 1 year extra 
compared with the standard study time of most university educations. 
A2 Student loans 
While receiving student benefits students also have the possibility to take up a state adminis-
trated subsidized loan that payout 2,562 DKK per month (2008 level). The loan cannot be 
received if the student cancelled student benefits and student loans might therefore give an 
additional incentive not to do so. The loans are paid back after the student leaves the educa-
tional system according to a fixed schedule. 
A3 Income control 
When students receive student benefits they are subject to an income test. The test is auto-
matically done after the end of the income year by the student benefit administration, who 
draw the relevant information from the tax authorities income register of which most is 3rd 
party reported (see Kleven et al, 2011 for details). Based on this information the student 
benefit administration calculate a so-called “own income” (in Danish: egenindkomst), which 
consist of all income components except from the student benefits themselves, child bene-
fits, employer administrated pension contributions and income taxed under the stock income 
tax scheme (dividends and capital gains). 
The own income is compared to an individual income limit, which is generated as the sum of 
monthly amounts depending on the student’s actions: 
• In months where the student is eligible and receives student benefits a “low 
amount” of 6.370 DKK is added to the income limit. 
• In months where the student is eligible, but does not receive benefits (the student 
has cancelled benefits) a “medium amount” of 15.908 DKK is added. 
• In months where the student is ineligible for student benefits a “high amount” of 
30.619 DKK is added. 
On top of these amounts the income limit for parents is further increased by a yearly amount 
of 23.008 DKK per child below 18. 
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As the analysis in the paper only focuses on students who are fully eligible for student bene-
fits the entire year the key variation in the individual income limits comes from the students’ 
cancelling of benefits, which moves them from the low to the medium amount and thereby 
increase their income limit by 15,908 – 6,370 = 9,538 DKK per month cancelled relative to a 
baseline amount of 12 • 6,370 = 76,440 DKK per year. 
If a students’ own income exceeds his/her income limit the excess has to be paid back to the 
student benefit administration according to the following formula: of the first 9,538 DKK (= 
Medium – Low amount15) 50 percent has to be paid back, while further excess income is 
paid back 100 percent. Finally if the amount that is to be paid back exceeds 7,569 DKK (= 
basic student benefit rate for student not living with their parents + student loan payout) the 
payback is further increase by 7 percent. In the register the payback – except the 7 percent 
increase – is treated as a reduction in the received student benefits. 
 
 
 
  
                                                      
15 After the 2009 reform the low amount for the lower education is used for the tertiary educations. 
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Appendix B: Calculating own income and determining eligibility  
The data are constructed by drawing from a number of register data sets organized by Statis-
tics Denmark (DST). In particular income data from the tax return (INDH), education in-
formation (UDDA) and weekly information about recipient status for public transfers 
(DREAM) along with standard demographic information (BEF). Finally, the individual 
monthly earnings are draw from the E-income register (BFL) available from 2008 and on-
wards. All of these registers contain the entire Danish population and can be linked using a 
unique identification number. 
B1 Student benefits and income limit 
Eligibility for and payout of student benefits are determined from the DREAM data set, 
where the first challenge is to aggregate the weekly information into monthly information 
(the interval at which student benefits are paid out). This is done by first allocating weeks to 
months based on the position of Wednesday and then counting the number of weeks where 
student benefits have been paid out (code 651) and the number of weeks where an individual 
has been eligible for student benefits without receiving them (code 652). 
In a month with 4 weeks, 3 or more weeks with pay outs are coded as a month were the 
individual has received student benefits. Similarly 3 or more weeks with eligibility for student 
benefits without receiving them is coded as an eligible month (the individual has cancelled 
student benefits). In months with 5 weeks the number of weeks has to be 4 or more. 
These numbers are coupled with the educational and demographic registers to determine the 
benefit rate the each individual is eligible for and the income limit that the individual faces. 
The key variables here are the level of the current ongoing education (UDD) and the civil 
status (FM_mark), which can be used to determine whether individuals are not living with 
their parents (code 6). 
Finally, the number of children, which affects both the income limit and the benefit rate is 
calculated from the number of children below 18 in the household (variable PLADS, code 3) 
for the individuals who are not them self a child in a household (individuals not living with 
their parents). 
With the above variables the individual income limit is calculated as: 
 Income	limit	=	AmountLow	•	NoR	+	AmountMedium	•	NoE	+	AmountChild	•	NoC (B1) 
Where NoR is the number of months, where the individual receives student benefits. NoE is 
the number of months where the individual is eligible for student benefits without receiving 
them (student benefits have been cancelled), and NoC is the number of children below 18 
years. The amounts are the corresponding contributions to the income limit described in 
appendix A. 
B2 Own income 
When it comes determining “own income”, the income registers unfortunately do not con-
tain the own income variable constructed by the student benefit administration and this vari-
able therefore has to be constructed. A challenge in this respect is that the registers only 
Labor Supply and Optimization Frictions 
28 
 
 
contain pre-aggregated income variables and not the full set of information available on the 
tax return and it is therefore not possible simply to apply the code used by the student bene-
fit administration. Instead the own income variable is constructed by adding together labor 
income, capital income (earned interests) and transfers other than student benefits (excluding 
child related transfers) defined from the variables listed in table B1. 
Table B1 
Variables used in the constructed of own income 
Variables that is always included  
Labor income excl. labor market contribution LOENMV – SLUTBID 
Capital income (earned interest)  RENTEINDK 
Other transfers QMIDYD 
Additional variables that sometimes is included 
Business income NETOVSKYD 
Capital income from investment funds PEROEVRIGFORMUE  
– AKTIEINDK – SKATFRIYD 
Other types of income (scholarships etc.) RESUINK_GL 
 
Notes: A more detail description of the variables (in Danish) can be found at www.dst.dk/times.  
 
These 3 income components, however, do not fully cover the income that is included in the 
student benefit administrations definition of own income. In particular, business income 
among self-employed students, capital income from investment funds16 and other types of 
income such and certain types of scholarships are included in the student benefit administra-
tions definition but not in the three main components included here. 
The additional income components can in principle be found in the register data from the 
variables listed in table B1, but these variables do not precisely correspond to the variables 
that the student benefit administration uses – either because they are calculated net of certain 
deductions (NETOVSKUD) or because they include additional income components. A 
general inclusion of these variables therefore adds as much error to the own income variable 
as leaving them out. Instead I apply the following strategy for determining the individual 
own income. 
First I calculate each individual’s own income based on the 3 main income components and 
the individual income limit based on the number of months of student benefits and the level 
of his current study and the number of children. The difference between the own income 
and the income limit identify the excess income that is to be deducted according to the for-
mula described in appendix A in the benefits that the student benefit administrations initially 
have paid out. 
Second I identify the actual deduction based on the difference between the student benefits 
that initially have been paid out and the final level of student benefits registered in the tax 
returns (variable: STIP). For the individuals with positive deductions I can uniquely identify 
the excess income that would correspond to the observed deduction. 
                                                      
16 But not direct dividend payments and capital gain taxes under the stock income scheme. 
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Finally, if difference between the excess income calculated in step 1 and the excess income 
calculated in step 2 exactly (+/- 2 DKK) corresponds to a combination of the 3 additional 
income components listed in table B1, I add these income components to the own income 
variable for that individual. 
Of course this procedure is potential problematic as it only add to the precision of the varia-
ble for the individuals who exceeds the income limit and because the procedure risk adding 
wrong income components that simply by chance matches the difference between the excess 
income calculated in step 1 and step 2, while the error might come from errors in the applied 
benefit rates. 
However, given that the additional income components have to exactly match the differ-
ences in own income it seems safe to assume that risk of addition wrong components is 
minimal and given that the amount of frictions in section 4 is identified from the individuals 
exceeding the income limit, I choose to do this adjustment to the own income definition. 
Over the 6 years 2006-2011 the adjustment is applied to 32,000 individuals or 5 percent of 
the student sample in tertiary educations. 
B3 Assessing the accuracy of the own income variable and income limit 
With the above construction of the own income variable it is important to assess the accura-
cy of the variables – especially because measurement error in the outcome variable will create 
an upward bias in the estimations of optimization frictions.17 
In order to do this, I calculate each individual’s predicted student benefits based on the 
number of month the individual have received student benefits during the year, their income 
limit and their own income. If the predicted student benefits lies within +/- 10 DKK of the 
actual student benefits I define it as a “hit”. 
There is however two problems with this way of assessing the accuracy of the own income 
and income limit. First of all a hit also depend on an accurate modelling of the student bene-
fit rates – a potentially large source of error given the number of rates described in appendix 
A, but this type of error of less importance for the analysis of labor supply responses in the 
paper. Secondly – and more problematic – (small) errors in the own income variable only 
affected the predicted student benefits, if the own income excess the income limit. The as-
sessment of the accuracy of the own income variable is therefore only precise above the 
income limit. 
Table B2 summarizes the proportions of hits (the hit rate) for different parts of the sample. 
At an aggregate level the procedure accurately predicts the student benefits for 2/3 of the 
sample with better hit rate for the tertiary students (80 percent hit rate) than for the students 
in lower educations (40 percent hit rate), which is probably due to larger variety in the bene-
fits rates for students in lower educations.  
Table B2 
                                                      
17 This is in contrast to “regular” regression analysis, where measurement error in the outcome varia-
ble only will lead to higher standard errors. 
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Assessing the accuracy of the own income definition 
Hit rate (percent) 2007 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Aggregate his rate 66.4 66.0 65.1 65.6 67.8 67.9 
- Lower educations 40.7 42.2 41.1 35.1 42.1 42.2 
- Tertiary education 81.6 80.4 80.1 83.3 84.7 84.4 
Among the tertiary students       
- below the income limit 85.1 84.2 83.4 85.1 86.1 85.6 
- above the income limit 58.6 58.1 61.3 59.9 65.1 65.1 
 
Notes: A “hit” of the own income definition is definitions as a predicted student benefits within +/- 
10 DKK of the actual final student benefits received. 99.9 percent of the hits are with +/- 1 
DKK, which can be attributed to rounding errors. Tertiary education include university edu-
cation and educations such as nurses and school teachers (ISCED2011 level 5 and above). 
Lower educations include high school (gymnasium) and vocational educations (ISCED2011 
level 3-4). 
Source:  Own calculations based on DST. 
 
Among the tertiary students the hit rate is naturally higher for the student below the income 
limit, where the marginal errors in the own income does not affected the predicted student 
benefits. Some of these errors can be attributed to errors in the applied student benefit rate 
due to e.g. student moving from their parents during the year, child birth and “double clip-
ping” prior to 2008, however trying to control for these types of errors does not significantly 
improve the hit rate – especially for the individuals above the income limit. 
As a consequence of this potential measurement error in either the own income and/or the 
income limit I conduct a robustness test in appendix C by replicating the key graphs in the 
paper only with the part of the sample, where I can accurately predict the final student bene-
fits. As the appendix shows this sample restriction does not affect the conclusions signifi-
cantly. 
B4 The monthly income data (E-income) 
The monthly income data is collected from the E-income statistics from 2008, which is col-
lected by the Danish tax authorities. It is mandatory for all firms to report their wage pay-
ments to this register.  
From this statistics I draw the variable AJO_SMALT_LOENBEGREB, which corresponds 
to the labor income variable used in table B1 gross of labor market contribution. As the 
labor market contribution is 8 percent the variable is made net by multiplying by 0.92. With 
this correction the yearly income in the E-income statistics almost exactly matches the labor 
income in the yearly income register. Put into numbers, a regression of labor income on 
yearly E-income yields a parameter estimate of 0.997 with a R2 of 0.989.  
B5 Sample size 
With the data drawn from the registers I get the breakdown of the size of the Danish student 
population shown in table B3. The core sample consists of students, who are fully eligible 
for student benefits and employed. They numbers around 85,000 per year. 
Table B3 
The size of the Danish student population 
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1,000 persons 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Everybody aged 18-30 813.5 820.3 833.4 841.1 855.4 869.2 
In education 327.5 333.1 334.4 338.6 354.4 379.3 
Of these:       
- Lower education 183.6 188.5 190.4 194.2 202.1 214.2 
- Tertiary education 143.9 144.6 144.1 144.4 152.3 165.1 
Among the tertiary students 
- Fully eligible 97.6 97.8 97.7 98.2 105.8 115.9 
-- Employed1) (core sample) 85.0 86.2 86.1 84.4 88.8 95.6 
--- Also the year after 52.3 52.9 53.7 53.0 55.4  
 
1) Employed is defined as having a positive labor income. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
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Appendix C: Robustness check wrt. measurement error 
As shown in appendix B it is not possible to precisely predict the student benefits received 
for the entire sample of students. In the case these errors are a result of errors in the coding 
of the benefit rates it will not affect the analyses conducted in the paper, however if the er-
rors stems from errors in the coding of the individual income limits or individual own in-
come it poses a threat, as these measurement errors will make some individuals behavior 
appear sub-optimal. 
As a robustness check to the analyses in the paper I therefore repeat the key figures in the 
paper (figure 3-5) using only the part of the sample, where I can actually predict their final 
student benefits. 
Figure C1 corresponds to figure 3 in the paper and shows the same general patterns as the 
original figure, except from a slightly steeper drop in the density at the kink point. However 
this steeper drop is partly mechanical, as the predicted student benefits only depend on mar-
ginal changes in the own income and the individual income limit above the baseline income 
limit. Small errors in these components will therefore only lead to an exclusion from the 
sample above this limit and thereby create the steeper drop. 
Figure C1 
The income distribution for tertiary students, 2006-2008 
 
Notes: See notes to figure 3. The line for “Everybody” corresponds to average over the years in 
figure 3. “Only correctly predicted student benefits” only includes individuals with predicted 
student benefits with +/- 10 DKK of the actual student benefits received. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
 
Similar the exclusion of the individuals, where I cannot accurately predict student benefits, 
does not significantly affect the conclusions drawn from the other key figures, cf. figure C2 
and figure C3. 
Figure C2 
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The income distribution for tertiary students before and after the 2009 reform 
 
Notes: See notes to figure 4 and figure C1. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
 
Figure C3 
The income distribution for tertiary students who cancel 1 month of student benefits 
 
Notes: See notes to figure 5 and figure C1. For the correctly predicted sample the mass in the domi-
nated region is 12 percent. 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
Appendix D: Deriving the costs of inattention 
This appendix describes how I use the shape of the mass found in dominated regions to 
quantify the level of optimizations frictions, as mentioned in section 4.3 in the paper. More 
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precisely this appendix provides estimates of the variance of the earnings errors (caused by 
inattention) and the expected cost for individuals associated with these errors. 
In a normal setting it is not possible estimate the variance of earnings errors as it is not pos-
sible to split an observed individual earnings level into the earnings that the individual target-
ed and a earnings error. This is illustrated in figure D1, which shows a simulated earnings 
distributions, where individuals target earnings are uniformly distributed from 10 to 20, while 
realized earnings is given by this target plus and a normally distributed error. Considering e.g. 
individuals in this setting with an observed earnings level of 16, these individuals include 
both individuals, who targeted this earnings level, as well as individuals who targeted other 
earnings levels but ended up for deviating from this target. 
Figure D1 
Illustration of the identification of earnings errors 
 
Notes: The observed earnings distribution shows a simulated earnings distributions, where individu-
als target earnings are uniformly distributed from 10 to 20, while realized earnings is given by 
this target plus and a normally distributed error. The mirrored distribution shows the mirror 
of the observed distribution around the mirror point 20. The target specific earnings distri-
butions shows the distribution of earnings errors for a given earnings target. The mass of 
these distributions have been scaled to equal the mass under the mirrored distribution. 
 
In contract the presence of dominated regions enables you to put bounds on the earning 
levels that individuals target. In figure D1 this is illustrated with a dominated region from 
earnings 20 and above, and as a consequence all observed earnings above 20 must be due to 
earnings errors among individuals with earnings targets below 20. A lower bound on each 
individuals earnings error is therefore their observed earnings minus 20. This is a lower 
bound as some individuals might have target earnings below this level.  
Further assuming symmetry of the errors distribution, you can mirror the observed earnings 
distribution in the dominated region to get an estimate of total error distribution and from 
there calculate measures such as e.g. a standard error. Doing this for the mirrored distribu-
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tion in figure D1 yields a standard error of 2/3 compared to an actual standard error of 1, 
which precisely indicate the lower bound nature of the method in this setting. 
Turning to the actual earnings distribution for the students who cancelled exactly 1 month of 
benefits (shown in figure 5 in the paper) I benefit from the fact that the range of earnings in 
which it is optimal to cancel this amount of student benefits is relative narrow and – as a 
consequence – the room for error when assign a target earnings level to individual is re-
duced. 
Figure D2 
Calculation of the costs of inattention for tertiary students who cancel 1 month of 
student benefits 
 
Notes: The actual distribution is the average density for the years 2006-08 also shown in figure 5 in 
the paper. The mirrored distributions shows the actual distribution mirrored around 3 differ-
ent mirror point (-4,500, 0 and 9,000 respectively). The implied loss of disposable income 
shows the maximum increase in disposable income that a student with a given excess income 
could have obtained by cancelling more or less student benefits. 
Source: Statistics Denmark and own calculations 
 
Still, in the figure D2 I consider 3 different mirrorings of the earnings distribution: 1) the 
actual start of the dominated region (excess income = 9,000 DKK), 2) 0 excess income and 
3) the mode of the distribution (excess income = -4,500 DKK). These mirrored distributions 
yield a standard error of 20-25,000 DKK, cf. table D1.18 
Table D1 
Quantifying the costs of inattention, 2006-08 
Benefits cancelled: 0 months 1 month 
Mirror point: >-4.500 > 0 > 9,000 >-4.500 > 0 > 9,000 
                                                      
18 These standard errors are relatively large, which reflect that the distributions have relatively fat tails. 
If I instead calculate the cut-offs levels for the 95% confidence intervals these the absolute distances 
to the mirror point becomes 28,000 for the 0 mirror point and 10,000 for the 9,000 mirror point. 
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Mass1) 14.5 11.1 5.0 37.4 30.3 14.9 
Standard error2) 19.1 20.5 25.0 21.6 22.4 26.5 
Expected costs3) 0.7 1.1 2.4 2.3 2.2 3.0 
 
Notes: Excess income = earned income – income limit. 
1)  Share of the sample with earnings above the mirror point (percent). 
2) Standard error calculated from the mirrored distribution (1,000 DKK). 
3) The expected cost is calculated by computing the increase in disposable income from opti-
mal cancelling of student benefits for each level of excess income and integrating over these 
amounts using the mirrored distributions (1,000 DKK). 
Sources: Own calculations based on DST 
 
Figure D2 also shows the maximum increase in disposable income that a student with a giv-
en excess income could have obtained by cancelling more or less student benefits. At nega-
tive excess incomes this increase comes from the fact the a student could have obtained the 
same income limit without having cancelled student benefits, while the increase at positive 
excess incomes comes from the fact that students could have avoided the 100 percent mar-
ginal tax rate by cancelling additional months of student benefits. Integrating over this loss 
function with the densities from the mirrored distribution gives an expected cost of the earn-
ings errors – which can be interpreted as a result of inattention – of around 2-3,000 DKK. 
Replicating the same calculations for the students who do not cancel student benefits yields 
standard error estimates of the same size as for the students who cancel 1 month, while the 
estimated expected costs are lower for the lower mirror points, cf. table D1. The lower ex-
pected costs reflect that there are no costs associated with negative earning errors for the 
students who do not cancel benefits, as their already receive the maximum amount.  
Labor Supply and Optimization Frictions 
37 
 
 
Appendix E: GMM estimation of the labor supply of students 
As a supplement to the non-parametric estimates of the labor supply elasticity in the paper I 
present in this appendix a more structural approach that jointly identifies the labor supply 
elasticity and the amount of variance in their final earnings relative to their desired earnings 
students are willing to accept.19  
The idea behind the structural approach is to formula a model of labor supply under earn-
ings uncertainty and the Danish student benefit system, simulate the effect of a reform simi-
lar to the 2009 reform descripted in the paper and estimate the two parameters by minimiz-
ing the squared difference between the simulated changes in the earnings distribution and 
the observed change in the distribution shown in figure 9. In this way the approach falls into 
the frame of GMM (Generalized method of moments) estimation. 
E1 The model 
Following the norm in most recent empirical papers in public finance I start with a simple 
quasi-linear utility function (see e.g. Saez et. al., 2012): 
 𝑢E = 𝑐E − 𝜇𝑛E1 + 𝜇 𝑧E𝑛E IJKK  (E1) 
where 𝑐 is private consumption and 𝑧 is the income level that the individuals target. 𝜇 and 𝑛 
is parameters of the utility function that can be interpreted as the labor supply elasticity and 
potential earnings, respectively. Final earnings (𝑧) is stochastic and given by:  
 𝑧E = 𝑧E + 𝜀E (E2) 
where 𝜀E is an iid. error term. 
The budget constraint that the students are facing can be written as follows:  
 𝑐E = 1 − 𝑡 𝑆𝐵 − 𝑞 𝑇E − 𝐿 ∙ 1 𝑇E > 𝐿 + 𝑧E ∙ 1 𝑧E ≤ 𝑇E + 𝑇E ∙ 1 𝑧E > 𝑇E  (E3) 
This equation states that if students raise their announced income target (𝑇) above the base-
line income limit (𝐿) the baseline student benefits (𝑆𝐵) is phase out at a rate 𝑞. Next, given 
the announced income target the students are allowed to keep any income below this target, 
while any excess income is taxed at 100 percent. The announced income target thus effec-
tively constitutes an income ceiling for the student. Finally, both student benefits and earned 
income is subject to the ordinary tax system, which here is summarized by the (marginal) tax 
rate 𝑡. 
In order to simplify the optimization I assume that the students are risk neutral and that 𝜀E is 
normal 𝑁(0, 𝜎) distributed. In this setting maximizing expected utility only depends on in-
come through expected consumption, which given (E3) can be written as: 
                                                      
19  I do not model inattention endogenously, but simply assume that individuals cannot ob-
serve/reoptimize their earnings during the year. In this way the estimated end-of-year earnings varia-
tion should be interpreted as the underlying earnings variance net of reoptimization during the year.  
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 𝐸 𝑐E = 1 − 𝑡 ∙  
 𝑆𝐵 − 𝑞(𝑇E − 𝐿) ∙ 1 𝑇E > 𝐿 + 𝑧E − 𝜎 𝑓 𝜃E𝐹 𝜃E ∙ 𝐹 𝜃E + 𝑇E ∙ 1 − 𝐹 𝜃E  (E4) 
where 𝜃E = Z[\][^ .  
Optimal behavior implies the follows two first order conditions for 𝑇 and 𝑧 respectively: 
 𝜕𝐸 𝑢E𝜕𝑇E = 0 ⇔ 𝜕𝐸 𝑐E𝜕𝑇E = 0 ⇔ 1 − 𝐹 𝑇E − 𝑧E𝜎 = 𝑞,	for	𝑇E > 𝐿 (E5) 
 𝜕𝐸 𝑢E𝜕𝑧E = 0 ⇔ 𝜕𝐸 𝑐E𝜕𝑐E = 𝑧E𝑛E IK ⇔ 𝑧E = 1 − 𝑡 𝐹 𝑇E − 𝑧E𝜎 K 𝑛E (E6) 
Both conditions have a straightforward economics interpretation. When it comes to raising 
the announced income target students have to balance the decrease in the probability that 
their marginal income will hit the income ceiling with the phase out of student grant. Be-
cause I have assumed risk neutrality this probability has to exactly equal the phase out rate. 
Second, given the announced income target the students choose a target income (labor sup-
ply) as a function of not only the standard tax rate (𝑡) but also the implicit tax rate created 
by the risk of hitting the income ceiling. The strength of the responses to the effective mar-
ginal tax rate depend on labor supply elasticity (𝜇). Finally, note that the students in the 
absence of taxes and phase out of student benefits in this model will target an earnings of  𝑛E , which therefore can be interpreted as potential (expected) earnings. 
E2 Simulation 
Before moving into the actual estimation, I present the performance of the model based on a 
simulation with fixed parameter values. The simulation is done by solving the model for a 
large number of individuals with different drawn of the distribution of potential earnings and 
with different realizations of the stochastic component of income (𝜀). More concretely I 
draw log potential earnings (measured in 1,000 DKK) form a normal distribution with mean 
4.3 and standard error 0.5 and set the labor supply elasticity (𝜇) to 0.1 and the standard error 
of the stochastic component of earnings (𝜎) to 7. 
In this setting I implement both the pre-reform policy setting (𝐿 = 76.4, 𝑞 = 0.525) and 
the post-reform setting (𝐿 = 94.4, 𝑞 = 0.623). The tax rate (𝑡) is in both cases set to 0.41. 
The resulting earnings distributions are show in figure E1, which shows the same shift in 
mass from below the pre-reform kink point to a range above as in figure 4 in paper. The 
figure also reports elasticity estimated using the same non-parametric method as in section 6. 
The method is able to recover the true elasticity with a small downwards bias, which stems 
from the fact that the post-reform distribution that is used as the local counterfactual distri-
bution at the pre-reform kink point, is affected by the post-reform kink due to the optimiza-
tion frictions as also discussed in the section 6. 
Figure E1 
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Simulated earnings distribution before and after the 2009 reform. 
 
Notes: Simulated distribution of realized earnings based on a draw of 100,000 individuals with log 
earnings normally distributed with mean 4.3 and standard error 0.5. 𝜇 = 0.1 and 𝜎 = 7. 
Sources: Own calculations 
 
E3 GMM estimation 
From the simulation above I can calculate a change in the frequency in each bin and map 
this to the actually changes seen in figure 4 and from there, choose the parameter values of 𝜇 
and 𝜎 that minimizes the sum of squared errors between the actual and simulated data. This 
procedure yields an estimate of the labor supply elasticity of 0.06 and standard error of 𝜀 of 
6,000 DKK. 20 The estimated labor supply elasticity is in other word more or less the same as 
the non-parametric estimate in the paper, while the standard error of individuals’ final earn-
ings is significant smaller. Given these parameter estimates I obtain a simulated change in the 
earnings distributions compared to the actual change as shown in figure E2. 
Figure E2 
Simulated and actual change in the earnings distribution following the 2009 reform 
                                                      
20 The estimation is done as a grid search going from 𝜇=0.01 to	𝜇=0.20 in steps of 0.01 and from 𝜎 = 
1 to 𝜎 = 20 in steps of 0.5. If the objective function is defined as the change in the distribution rela-
tive to the pre-reform distribution I obtain 𝜇 =0.09 and 𝜎 = 8,000 DKK. 
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Notes: Simulated distribution of realized earnings based on a draw of 100,000 individuals with log 
earnings normally distributed with mean 4.3 and standard error 0.5.	𝜇 = 0.05 and 𝜎 = 6.5. 
Sources: Own calculations 
 
E4 The position of the excess mass 
As mentioned in the paper it might appear strange that the excess mass uncovered by the 
shift in the earnings distribution following the 2009 reform appeared significantly below the 
kink point and not centered on the kink point as you would expect. However as already seen 
in figure E1 this is a consistent feature of the model, where individuals can cancel benefits in 
order to avoid the 100 percent marginal tax rate. 
The reason behind this non-centered excess mass in the case with a possibility to cancel 
benefits comes from the effect that this possibility has on the effective marginal tax rate. In 
the standard setting without earnings uncertainty this is simply equal to the statutory margin-
al tax rate and a kink in the tax schedule thus creates a discrete jump in the marginal tax rate. 
Adding earnings uncertainty to this setting smoothes the jump, so that the effective marginal 
tax rate increases “symmetrically” from the low tax rate to the high tax rate around the kink 
point.21 
Without the possibility to cancel benefits the kink point faced by students is effectively a 
jump from 41 to 100 percent marginal tax rate, and so with earnings uncertainty the effective 
marginal tax rate increases smoothly between these 2 rates symmetrically around the kink 
point, cf. figure E3. 
With the possibility to cancel benefits students can effectively move up the kink point by 
phasing out benefits, and from equation E5 we see that they will do this until the probability 
of hitting the 100 percent tax rate is equal to the phase out rate. As a consequence the effec-
                                                      
21 The symmetry comes from the symmetry of the distribution of earnings errors. If this distribution is 
not symmetric the change in the marginal tax rate will neither be symmetric. 
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tive marginal tax rate profile will follow the profile without the possibility to cancel benefits 
until it equals the phase out rate, where after it becomes caped (in the present case at 72 
percent), cf. figure E3. As a result the smoothed increase in the effective marginal tax will no 
longer be symmetric around the kink point. 
Figure E3 
Effective marginal tax rates with and without the possibility to cancel benefits 
 
Notes: The effective marginal tax rate is calculated as 1 − 1 − 𝑡 𝐹 Z[\][^ , where 𝑇E is set so 1 −𝐹 Z[\][^ = 𝑞,	for	𝑇E > 𝐿. (equations E5 and E6 above). In the case without phase out of 
benefits 𝑞 = 0 ⇒ 𝑇E ≈ ∞ ⇒ 𝐹 Z[\][^ = 1. In the case without the possibility to cancel 
benefits 𝑞 = 1 ⇒ 𝑇E = 𝐿 ⇒ 𝐹 Z[\][^ = 𝐹 l\][^ . Simulations are done with 𝜎 = 2. 
Sources: Own calculations 
 
Translating the profiles of the effective marginal tax rates into earnings distributions I again 
simulate the model, where I in order to simplify matters assume a uniform distribution of 
potential earnings. The resulting distributions are shows in figure E4. In absence of phase 
out of benefits the earnings distribution simply follows the distribution of potential earnings, 
while phase out without the possibility to cancel creates a large excess mass more or less 
centered on the kink point. Compared to this outcome it is clear from the figure that the 
possibility to cancel benefits shifts the excess mass below the kink point. 
 
Figure E4 
Simulated earnings distribution with and without the possibility to cancel benefits 
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Notes: Simulated distribution of realized earnings based on a draw of 100,000 individuals with po-
tential earnings uniformly distributed from 50 to 150 with the baseline income limit = 100.	𝜇 
= 0.1 and 𝜎 = 5. 
Sources: Own calculations 
 
It should be noted that the earnings distribution without phase out of benefits does not 
equal the distribution of potential earnings as the presence of the linear tax reduces earnings 
and hence increases the density compared the density of potential earnings (except at the 
very top of the earnings distribution, where the density drops to 0). This is also the reason 
why the excess mass in the setting without the possibility to cancel is not exactly centered on 
the kink point, as the increased marginal tax rate to the right of the kink point even without 
the excess mass increases the density just above the kink point. In the extreme case here 
where the marginal tax rate jumps to 100 percent, this creates the perception that the excess 
mass is centered to the right of the kink point. 
